Wikileaks: Michel Temer era informante do governo americano
Não venham me dizer que estou inventando coisas!
Sei que parece teoria da conspiração, papo de esquerdista maluco, mas não posso fazer nada.
Não fui eu que disse. Foi o Wikileaks. Hoje.
A organização divulgou, em seu twitter, nesta noite de quinta-feira, um micropost em que acusa o “presidente interino” Michel Temer de ser informante do governo americano.
Observe que o Wikileaks chama o impeachment de Dilma Rousseff pelo que ele é: um golpe parlamentar.
Os bilhetes diplomáticos não mostram, a meu ver, nada explosivo. Seria exagerado chamar Michel Temer de “informante da CIA”, por exemplo. Ele não valia tanto para a CIA.
O Wikileaks o chama apenas de “informante da embaixada americana”. O que é a mesma coisa de ser chamado de “informante do governo americano”, visto que as informações que ele fornece são remetidas imediatamente para órgãos estratégicos do governo dos Estados Unidos.
Os bilhetes não são classificados, ou seja, não são secretos, mas contém informações que devem ser usadas apenas entre as autoridades do governo americano.
Temer subsidia o Cônsul Geral de São Paulo com informações, de fato, sensíveis, sobretudo partindo de um aliado político do governo brasileiro. Ele faz, por exemplo, críticas pesadas ao governo Lula, dizendo que ele investia muito em programas sociais… E menciona a possibilidade do PMDB construir uma candidatura própria.
O atual presidente interino, já então presidente do PMDB, diz outra coisa perigosa a se dizer a um membro do ultra-conservador serviço de inteligência do governo americano, como são quase todos os cônsules, em especial os de São Paulo e Rio: Temer afirma que Lula daria uma forte guinada à esquerda em seu segundo governo. Um aliado do governo afirmar isso a um agente da inteligência norte-americana é uma irresponsabilidade!
Coisa de traíra mesmo.
Temer estava entregando estratégias políticas internas ultrasensíveis, em vocabulário alarmante, a uma autoridade do serviço de inteligência de uma potência altamente agressiva e bélica como os Estados Unidos!
Outra parte que revela o caráter traiçoeiro de Temer é quando aborda os esquemas de corrupção do PT e não lembra ao cônsul que o seu próprio partido é o mais corrupto de todos. Manchar a imagem do partido aliado, numa reunião secreta com o embaixador americano, não me parece uma postura leal e digna.
Os bilhetes do Wikileaks não provam que Michel Temer estivesse na folha de pagamento da CIA, mas revelam um traidor contumaz, um traidor de seus aliados no Brasil e, portanto, um traidor também dos interesses nacionais.
Há um capítulo, inclusive, que o funcionário do serviço secreto americano, que resenha o bilhete, dá um título irônico às falas de Michel Temer: “With Allies Like This . . . ”
Que significa: “Com um aliado como esse…”
Os mexicanos diriam, ironicamente: muy amigo!
O funcionário, naturalmente, ficou chocado com a falta de cuidado de Michel Temer, em revelar tão abertamente, tão loquazmente, a um representante de governo estrangeiro, a discórdia surda, crescente, entre PT e PMDB.
A NSA, pelo jeito, não tem muito o que fazer por aqui: os nossos políticos vazam, voluntariamente, informações sensíveis ao governo americano. Se vazam de graça, não posso dizer.
Links dos dois bilhetes vazados:
PMDB CHIEF AFFIRMS PARTY’S POSITION AS POWER BROKER BUT BALKS AT PREDICTING PRESIDENTIAL RACE
Date: 2006 June 21, 16:05 (Wednesday)
UNCLASSIFIED,FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED,FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
TAGS: BR – Brazil | ECON – Economic Affairs–Economic Conditions, Trends and Potential | PGOV – Political Affairs–Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PINR – Political Affairs–Intelligence
Concepts: — Not Assigned —
From: Brazil São Paulo
To: Argentina Buenos Aires | Bolivia La Paz | Brazil Brasilia | Brazil Recife | Brazil Rio De Janeiro | Chile Santiago | Department of Commerce | Department of Labor | Department of the Treasury | National Security Council | Paraguay Asunción | Secretary of State | United States Southern Command (Miami) | Uruguay Montevideo
(C) SAO PAULO 623; (D) BRASILIA 1136;
(E) SAO PAULO 573 AND PREVIOUS; (F) SAO PAULO 30
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY
1. (SBU) Michel Temer, President of the Brazilian Democratic
Movement Party (PMDB), believes President Lula has done a masterful
job of disassociating himself from the political corruption scandals
that have crushed some of his closest advisers. He also has
effectively expanded social programs to earn the loyalty and support
of Brazil’s lower-middle and lower classes. At the same time,
Lula’s opponent, Sao Paulo ex-Governor Geraldo Alckmin, suffers from
a lack of charisma and a failure to have left a visible mark in five
years at the helm of Brazil’s largest state. Nevertheless, Temer
declines to predict what will happen in this race, except to say it
will go to a second round, in which “anything can happen.” He
confirmed that his own party will not run a candidate for president
and will not ally with either Lula’s Workers Party (PT) or the
opposition Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), at least not
before the second round. However, the PMDB will win the governors’
races in at least ten and possibly as many as fifteen states, and
will again have the largest bloc in both the Senate and the Chamber
of Deputies, so that “whoever wins the presidential election will
have to come to us to get anything done.” END SUMMARY.
LULA’S SLEIGHT OF HAND
2. (SBU) In a June 19 meeting with Consul General (CG) and Poloff,
Michel Temer, Federal Deputy from Sao Paulo, offered his assessment
of the balance of forces for the presidential election. Though
anything can still happen — he has seen candidates overcome much
greater disadvantages than Alckmin currently faces, and win — it is
clear that President Lula is in a strong position. Temer
dispassionately analyzed how Lula had seen his Chief of Staff and
the entire leadership of his party disgraced, and prominent
Congressional members of his party dragged through scandal, and had
emerged personally more or less untouched. This was partly because
other political parties — Temer mentioned the PSDB and the Liberal
Front Party (PFL) but not his own PMDB, though his comment could
just as easily apply to them — had, at different times, been
involved in affairs akin to the PT’s infamous “mensalao” bribery
scheme, and were thus not eager to expose the PT’s misdeeds to the
3. (U) It was also because Lula had such a strong bond with the
people, the so-called C, D, and E classes – i.e., the lower-middle
and lower classes. Many in these strata, in Temer’s view, believe
that Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) had robbed the poor and given
to the rich, while Lula robs the rich and gives to the poor. Lula
has expanded the “Bolsa Familia” program from 6.5 million families
in 2004 to 8.7 million in 2005 to 11 million families this year, or
(assuming two children per family) roughly 44 million Brazilians.
This, combined with the increase in the minimum wage, the rise of
the Real against the US dollar, and the fall in the price of certain
basic food staples, make the poor much better off. Paradoxically,
many of the rich, especially bankers and other major financial
players, have also benefited from Lula’s policies.
4. (SBU) It is the middle class that has suffered from both an
increasing tax burden and the loss of professional-level jobs. In
SAO PAULO 00000689 002 OF 004
truth, Temer continued, it is difficult to be optimistic about
Brazil’s economic future. The fact of 11 million families eligible
for Bolsa Familia handouts implies a minimum of 44 million people in
abject misery in Brazil. He described a recent event he had
attended sponsored by the Institute for Industrial Development
Studies (IEDI), where Minister of Development, Commerce, and
Industry Luiz Fernando Furlan delivered an upbeat speech. When
challenged by a member of the audience with a few hard questions and
statistics, Furlan, who has himself been at times a tough critic of
the GoB’s economic policies, was at pains to respond. Brazil faces
serious challenges in fostering growth, stimulating productivity,
attracting investment, improving infrastructure, and reducing
inequality; however, Lula’s sleight of hand has made many voters all
but unaware of these growing problems.
ALCKMIN’S LACK OF CHARISMA
5. (SBU) Meanwhile, Alckmin is simply stuck. Temer believes that
since inheriting the governorship from Mario Covas in 2001, Alckmin
has provided honest, decent, competent government to Sao Paulo.
However, in a country that relishes superlatives, he did not
champion any great works, and his accomplishments are not visible.
Alckmin is not personally aggressive or charismatic and is not given
to showmanship, so he didn’t leave a distinctive mark on the state.
By way of comparison, Orestes Quercia (ref C), Governor of Sao Paulo
from 1987 to 1990, was a controversial (many say corrupt) figure,
but he definitely left his mark on the state in the many streets and
highways and prisons and hospitals he built. (COMMENT: The same
might be said of colorful, and reportedly equally corrupt, former
Mayor and Governor Paulo Maluf. END COMMENT.) Former President
Cardoso was another example of a politician who had charisma. But
let’s wait and see what happens, Temer suggested. Wait until after
the World Cup, which could impact on the voters in a variety of
different and not easily predictable ways, depending on the result.
Wait until the government-subsidized television advertising begins.
It will be “a great war” on the airwaves, and it opens up
innumerable possibilities for the underdog.
6. (U) Temer, a former Sao Paulo state Secretary for Public
Security, was not certain whether Alckmin would suffer as a result
of the recent violence on the streets and in the prisons of Sao
Paulo (ref E) perpetrated by the criminal gang First Capital Command
(PCC). Some of his public criticism of his successor, Governor
Claudio Lembo, had been unfortunate and not good for his image. But
only time will tell how this situation plays out.
LULA’S TURN TO THE LEFT?
7. (SBU) CG asked what a second Lula term would look like, assuming
he is re-elected. Unlike some of our interlocutors, Temer believes
Lula may take a more radical (i.e., populist) approach during a
second term. The recent incident in which radicals from the
Movement for the Liberation of the Landless (MLST) stormed the
Chamber of Deputies (ref D) and committed acts of vandalism was a
harbinger of things to come. The group’s leader, a member of the
PT’s Executive Committee, had on many occasions over the years been
seen at Lula’s side. The PT had suspended him, but had taken no
further action and did not appear particularly upset over the
episode, Temer noted.
8. (SBU) Lula, in Temer’s view, was a trade unionist who had done
well for himself, who, once re-elected, might finally begin to heed
his friends on the left. Very possibly he would let himself be led
SAO PAULO 00000689 003 OF 004
away from the orthodox macro-economic policies that have dominated
his first term. (COMMENT: Some other observers have also pointed to
the GOB’s expansion of social spending in recent months as an
indication that Lula is drifting left. Thus far, however, this
spending seems in line with the pump-priming measures of most
incumbents seeking re-election. While Temer sees Lula’s campaign
pitting “rich versus poor” as a sign of things to come in a second
term, many analysts who have followed Lula’s career characterize him
as a “cultural conservative” who is unlikely to succumb to the
radical leftist/populist temptation. A more worrisome, and more
likely, scenario is a second-term Lula government that lacks the
policy direction, political will, and working majority in Congress
required to push through essential economic and political reforms.
PMDB – A HOUSE (STILL) DIVIDED
9. (SBU) Turning to his own party’s fortunes, Temer confirmed
reports that the PMDB will not run its own candidate for President,
and will not enter into a formal alliance with either the PSDB or
the PT. Any of these options at the national level, he explained,
would damage the party’s chances in some of the states because the
“verticalization” rule remains in effect during the 2006 elections.
The recent ruling by the Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE), which
would have tightened even further the rules governing party
alliances (ref B), was probably correct, Temer averred, even though
it would have been disastrous for the PMDB. If you’re going to
require parties to replicate their national alliances at the state
level, it makes perfect sense to go a step further and say that
parties that don’t run or formally support presidential candidates
may not ally at the state level with parties that do. Nevertheless,
as the head of a party whose lifeblood is coalition-building at the
state level, Temer was relieved when the TSE reversed itself within
48 hours, and he looked forward to the 2010 elections when the
Constitutional amendment abolishing the “verticalization” rule
altogether would enter into force.
10. (SBU) If the presidential election goes into a second round, as
Temer is sure it will, the PMDB may at that point throw its support
to one side or the other. The PMDB remains split almost evenly
between the pro- and anti-Lula groups. The former seeks alliances
with the PT and hopes for several Ministries in Lula’s second
administration. Temer, who is anti-Lula, was highly critical of the
pro-Lula faction and commented wryly over some of the party’s
internal contradictions and divisions. Renan Calheiros, President
of the Senate, is the leader of the PMDB’s pro-Lula faction; yet, in
his home state of Alagoas (northeast), the PMDB will support the
PSDB’s gubernatorial candidate, Senator Teotonio Vilela. Another
pro-Lula leader is Senator (and former President) Jose Sarney, but
his daughter, PFL Senator Roseana Sarney, will be running for
Governor of Maranhao (also in the northeast) with PMDB support
against a PT candidate. Temer outlined the situation state by
state, ending with Sao Paulo. The PSDB, he noted, badly wants an
alliance with the PMDB, but they want to choose the PMDB candidate
to be Jose Serra’s running mate. This issue will be resolved within
the week, since the PMDB holds its state convention on June 24. The
party will not hold a national convention June 29 as originally
planned, since all its issues at the national level were resolved at
a preliminary June 11 caucus.
11. (SBU) Temer, who himself had strongly favored fielding a PMDB
presidential candidate (ref F), noted that by relinquishing this
ambition, the PMDB stands to win the governors’ races in ten or
perhaps even fifteen states, and will again have the largest blocs
in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, whichever
SAO PAULO 00000689 004 OF 004
party wins the Presidency will inevitably have to seek an alliance
with the PMDB in order to govern. Temer spoke caustically of the
Lula administration’s miserly rewards for its allies in the PMDB.
They give the job of Minister to a PMDB loyalist, but no real
control over the Ministry; thus, he can’t accomplish anything. In
contrast, Temer believes that in return for joining a governing
alliance, the party should be given control over a sector of the
economy, agriculture, say, or health, and full responsibility for
operating that sector, and should receive full credit or blame for
the successes and failures in that sector. (COMMENT: Left unsaid,
of course, is that the sort of control Temer envisions would also
give the PMDB, and other allied parties, the opportunity to advance
their political patronage goals at the taxpayers’ expense. The
PMDB, which is Brazil’s largest political party, is already
well-known as a vehicle for patronage. END COMMENT.)
12. (SBU) Temer was more charitable in his assessment of Alckmin’s
campaign and his performance as Governor than Alckmin’s own PSDB
colleague, Andrea Matarazzo (ref A). Nevertheless, Temer’s critique
hits home: Alckmin may perform in the coming months, but so far he
simply has not connected at any level with the electorate. Lula’s
job performance, on the other hand, may be open to question, but his
ability to communicate with and relate to the average Brazilian is
unsurpassed. Temer is correct that whichever candidate wins will
need to turn to the PMDB for support in governing. The real problem
is that the PMDB has no ideology or policy framework that it could
bring to the task of formulating and implementing a coherent
national political agenda. Despite the party’s illustrious history
as the guiding force that led Brazil from military dictatorship to
democracy, the PMDB, which now holds the balance of political power,
has devolved into a loose coalition of opportunistic regional
“caciques” who for the most part – and there are exceptions – seek
political power for its own sake. Such a party is hardly suited to
the task of providing political direction, which would be
particularly important in a post-election alliance with Lula’s
rudderless PT. END COMMENT.
13. (U) This cable was coordinated/cleared with Embassy Brasilia.
PMDB LEADER PONDERS PARTY’S ELECTORAL OPTIONS
Date: 2006 January 11, 14:02 (Wednesday)
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED,FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED,FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
TAGS: BR – Brazil | ETRD – Economic Affairs–Foreign Trade | PGOV – Political Affairs–Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PINR – Political Affairs–Intelligence
From: Brazil São Paulo
To: Argentina Buenos Aires | Bolivia La Paz | Brazil Brasilia | Brazil Recife | Brazil Rio De Janeiro | Chile Santiago | National Security Council | Paraguay Asunción | Secretary of State | United States Southern Command (Miami) | Uruguay Montevideo
1. (U) Sensitive but Unclassified – protect accordingly.
2. (SBU) Summary: Federal Deputy Michel Temer, national
president of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB),
believes that public disillusion with President Lula and the
Workers’ Party (PT) provides an opportunity for the PMDB to
field its own candidate in the 2006 presidential election.
However, party divisions and the lack of a compelling choice
as a candidate could force the PMDB into an alliance with
Lula’s PT or the opposition PSDB. If Lula’s polling numbers
do not improve before the PMDB primaries in March, Temer
said his party might nominate its own candidate. This would
still allow the party to forge an alliance with the PT or
PSDB in a runoff, assuming that the PMDB candidate fails to
make the second round. Given its centrist orientation, the
PMDB may hold the balance of votes between the two opposing
forces. It is also likely to remain a force at the local
and state level. Temer believes it has a chance to win as
many as 14 gubernatorial races. End Summary.
With Allies Like This . . .
3. (SBU) Michel Temer, a Federal deputy from Sao Paulo who
served as president of the Chamber of Deputies from 1997
through 2000, met January 9 with CG and poloffs to discuss
the current political situation. Lula’s election, he said,
had raised great hope among the Brazilian people, but his
performance in office has been disappointing. Temer
criticized Lula’s narrow vision and his excessive focus on
social safety net programs that don’t promote growth or
economic development. The PT had campaigned on one program
and, once in office, had done the opposite of what it
promised, which Temer characterized as electoral fraud.
Worse, some PT leaders had stolen state money, not for
personal gain, but to expand the party’s power, and had thus
fomented a great deal of popular disillusion.
PMDB Perceives an Opening
4. (SBU) This reality, Temer continued, opens an
opportunity for the PMDB. The party currently holds nine
statehouses and has the second-highest number of federal
deputies (after the PT), along with a great many mayoralties
and city council and state legislative seats. Polls show
that voters are tired of both the PT and the main opposition
party, the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB). For
example, a recent poll showed former governor (and PMDB
state chairman) Orestes Quercia leading in the race for Sao
Paulo state governor.
Divisions Dog the Party
5. (SBU) Asked why the PMDB remains so divided, Temer said
the reasons were both historical and related to the nature
of Brazilian political parties. The PMDB grew out of the
Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) under the military
dictatorship, which operated as an umbrella group for
legitimate opposition to the military dictatorship. After
the restoration of democracy, some members left the PMDB to
form new parties (such as the PT and PSDB), but many of
those who remained now act as power brokers at the local and
regional level. Thus the PMDB has no real unifying national
identity but rather an umbrella organization for regional
“caciques” or bosses. Temer noted that the PMDB is not the
only divided party. Although there are 28 political parties
in Brazil, most of them do not represent an ideology or a
particular line of political thinking that would support a
SAO PAULO 00000030 002 OF 003
PMDB Primaries Set for March
6. (SBU) Temer confirmed press reports that he is seeking
to move the March 5 primary date to a date later in the
month. (Note: March 31 is the deadline for executives and
Ministers to resign their offices if they plan to run for
public office. End Note.) There will be some 20,000
electors, he said, including all PMDB members who hold
electoral office (federal and state deputies, governors,
mayors, vice-governors and -mayors, and other elected
municipal officials) as well as delegates chosen at state
Lula’s Numbers Will Drive PMDB Strategy
7. (SBU) If, between now and the primary, the Lula
government’s standing in the polls improves, it is still
possible the PMDB will seek an electoral alliance with Lula
and the PT, Temer said. If not, the PMDB will run its own
candidate. So far, Rio de Janeiro ex-governor Anthony
Garotinho has been working the hardest, reaching out to the
whole country in search of support. But there is resistance
to him from within the PMDB, in part due to his populist
image, in part because there appears to be a ceiling to his
support. Germano Rigotto, governor of Rio Grande do Sul
(reftels) is a possible candidate, though he is still not
well known outside the south. Nelson Jobim, a judge on the
Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) who has announced his
intention to step down, is another possibility; however, he
can’t campaign until he leaves the Tribunal, and he may not
have time to attract the support necessary to win the
PMDB’s Fallback – PT or PSDB in Second Round
8. (SBU) Temer was confident that despite its current
division, the PMDB will unite for the election, whether in
support of its own candidate or in alliance with another
party. If it runs a candidate who fails to make it to the
second round, the party will seek to negotiate an alliance
with one of the two finalists. He noted that the PMDB had
supported the government of PSDB former president Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, and said there should be a “re-fusion” of
the two parties into a permanent grand alliance. The PMDB
would have no problem with either Sao Paulo Mayor Jose Serra
or Sao Paulo state governor Geraldo Alckmin, who are
competing for the PSDB nomination. In 2002, the PMDB
supported Serra against Lula.
9. (SBU) Asked about the party’s program, Temer indicated
that the PMDB favors policies to support economic growth.
It has no objection to the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA). It would prefer to see Mercosul strengthened so as
to negotiate FTAA as a bloc, but the trend appears to be
moving the other way.
Comment: PMDB As Power Broker?
10. (SBU) For now, the PMDB is keeping its options open.
Though Temer didn’t mention it, the party’s leadership is
waiting to see whether the “verticalizacao” rule will remain
in force for the 2006 elections. This rule, decreed by a
2002 decision of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE),
dictates that electoral alliances at the national level must
be replicated in races for governors and federal deputies.
The Senate passed a measure repealing the rule, and the
lower chamber is expected to vote on it shortly, with
prospects uncertain. There is also a legal challenge to the
rule pending which the TSE will likely take up in February.
The PMDB wants to know the rules of the game before deciding
on possible alliances, since most observers believe that a
SAO PAULO 00000030 003 OF 003
PMDB presidential candidate would not fare well under the
current system of “verticalizacao.” Temer appeared open to
the possibility of an alliance with either the PT or the
PSDB, or to a stand-alone PMDB candidate. Given its
centrist orientation, the PMDB may hold the balance of votes
between Lula’s PT and the opposition PSDB, and thus bears
watching closely in the months ahead. End Comment.
11. (U) Biographic Note: Michel Miguel Elias Temer Lulia
has served as federal deputy from Sao Paulo since 1987,
except for a two-year period (1993-94) when he was Secretary
for Public Security in the Sao Paulo state government. He
studied at the University of Sao Paulo and earned a
Doctorate in Law from the Catholic University of Sao Paulo.
From 1984 through 1986 he was the state’s Prosecutor
General. He served as the PMDB’s leader in the Camara de
Deputados 1995-97 and as President of the Camara 1997-2000.
He was national president of the PMDB 2001-03 and 2004-
12. (U) This cable was cleared/coordinated with Embassy